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The ANPA Report on free press and fair trial makes it appear
that America's newspapermen and lawyers are locked in mortal combat
over the Constitution of the United States. The lawyers, according
to the Report, are bent on suppressing news about crime, thus subverting the first amendment, which provides that there shall be "no law
. .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Some lawyers,
equally intemperate, have charged the newspapers with reckless subversion of the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments (due process of
law and trial by an impartial jury).
One would hope that the reality is not as exciting as this rumor
of Armageddon. There is indeed an important conflict between the
two professions about how much information should be made available
prior to and during trial regarding persons accused of crime. But
when one gets past the passionate calls to battle and the inflammatory
slogans, one may find the real positions of the parties are not, in fact,
so very far apart. One needs to know precisely what the issues are
in order to choose sides intelligently.
First, what are the lawyers complaining about? Essentially, it
is that in some cases newspaper stories published between the time
of arrest and the time of trial create an atmosphere in which it is
difficult or impossible to get an unprejudiced jury. This happens in
the relatively few sensational cases.' The man arrested may have his
* The American Bar Association adopted the Advisory Committee's recommendaThe
tions at the February, 1968, meeting of the House of Delegates. See Reardon, 1968,
Fair Trial-FreePress Standards,54 A.B.A.J. 343 (1968) ; N.Y. Times, Feb. 20,
at 1, col. 6.
t Benjamin Franklin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.S. 1932,
LL.B. 1935, University of Pennsylvania. Member, Pennsylvania and Supreme Court

Bars.1

In its report, the Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press acknowledged that it owed its origin in part to the publicity surrounding the arrest and murder
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picture plastered on every front page and flashed on the TV screens.
He is exhibited before the public in handcuffs, surrounded by triumphant police. If he has a criminal record, it is fully reported. The
horrible circumstances of the crime are highlighted, arousing the
community's wrath against the man they already assume to be guilty.
If he has given a confession, that fact is hammered home by the mass
media, although it may turn out not only that the confession was
obtained by improper police methods, but also that it is totally false.
The lawyers are concerned about such pretrial publicity not
simply because it is difficult to impanel an unprejudiced jury in a
community which has been saturated with anti-defendant news. Their
concern extends to cases where no trial occurs (because the police
discover they have the wrong man) or where the defendant is acquitted
at trial. The damage to the unjustly accused person resulting from
the glare of publicity cannot be undone. The papers never devote as
much space to the release of an accused man as they gave to his arrest
in a "big case."
What do the lawyers want done about the problem? Basically,
the following:
1) They want to enforce against lawyers rules of professional
ethics that would specifically forbid lawyers from disclosing certain
information about cases in which they are involved. An attorney is
supposed to make his arguments in court, not in the papers. Although
the Canons of Ethics in their present form generally circumscribe pretrial disclosures,2 the standards proposed by the ABA would make it
clearly unethical for prosecutors to announce, in advance of trial, that
guilt has been determined; that such-and-such witnesses will testify
against the defendant; that the defendant has confessed; or that the
of Lee Harvey Oswald. The Committee quoted the following conclusion from the
Warren Report:
The experience in Dallas during November 22-24 is a dramatic affirmation
of the need for steps to bring about a proper balance between the right of the
public to be kept informed and the right of the individual to a fair and impartial trial.
AMERICAN BAR ASsOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 19 (Tentative Draft 1966)

[hereinafter cited as ABA TENTATIVE DRAFr], quoting REPORT OF THE PRESMENT'S
COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY 99 (1964).
The commentary accompanying the proposed standards pointed out that, over a
two year period, questions of prejudicial publicity were raised in about 100 reported
cases. ABA TENTATIVE DRAFT 23. Only a handful of cases result in reversal or mistrial on the ground of prejudice through publicity. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333 (1966) ; Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) ; Turner v. Louisiana, 379

U.S.2 466 (1965).
The present ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 20 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as proscribing
statements to news media by prosecutors, assistant prosecutors and their
lawyer staff members, as to alleged confessions or inculpatory admissions by
the accused, or to the effect that the case is "open and shut" against the defendant, and the like, or with reference to the defendant's prior criminal
record, either of convictions or arrests. Such statements have the capacity
to interfere with a fair trial and cannot be countenanced. ...
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defendant has failed or refused to take an examination or test.' The
proposed standards will also prohibit equivalent attacks on the prosecution's case by defense lawyers outside court.
However, under the proposed standards prosecutors and defense
attorneys will be permitted to release information about the occurrence
of the crime, the circumstances surrounding an arrest, the identity of
the arrested person, the description of any fugitive suspect,4 the outcome of a preliminary hearing before a magistrate, the date when
trial is scheduled, and the proceedings of the trial itself.5 In view of
these ABA recommendations, it is deplorable that the ANPA Report
describes the dangers involved as "secret arrest and ultimately secret
trial." (P. 5)
2) The lawyers believe that the police department should be
subject to the controls that apply to the prosecutor.6 There is no use
in barring the prosecutor from announcing evidence of guilt in advance
of trial, if the police are free to do so.'
3) Some lawyers have advocated application of the English
contempt system.' In England the courts have extensive and loosely
defined power to jail reporters, editors, broadcasters, lawyers, policeThe ban on statements by the prosecutor and his aides applies as well to
defense counsel.
State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 389, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964). But the ABA advisory committee found that "the canon's general language fails to give adequate
guidance and . . . has not been enforced." ABA TENTATIVE DRAFT 81. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECr ON MINIMUm STANDARDS
STANDARDS

RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS

1967) [hereinafter cited as ABA PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT].
3 ABA TENTATIVE DRAFT 2-3.

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

36 (Proposed Final Draft

4 ABA TENTATIV DRAFT 3-4.
4 ". . . if the defendant has not been apprehended, [the lawyer] may release any

information necessary to aid in his apprehension or to warn the public of any dangers
he may present. .

. ."

ABA TENTATIvE DRAFT 3.

In view of this specific allowance

for identification of fugitive suspects, it is difficult to understand editorial cartoons
which invoke the terrors of preventing newspapers from printing descriptions of
criminals at large, under some supposed but erroneous interpretation of the ABA
recommendations. See, e.g., Philadelphia Bulletin, Jan. 7, 1967, at 6, col. 3.
6ABA TENTATIvE DRAFT 5-7, 98-100. The standards for release of information
would be applied to law enforcement officers through the promulgation of rules of
court and departmental regulations. Control of pre-trial statements by police finds
parallels in the application of due process concepts beyond the courtroom and beyond
prosecutor's misconduct to activities of the police prior to trial. Giles v. Maryland,
386 U.S. 66 (1967) (non-disclosure of evidence favorable to defendant) ; Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (interrogation).
7 Here again, it should be noted that the police would be free to make statements
necessary for apprehending criminals or for warning the public. ABA TENTATivE
DRAFT 99.
In addition, law enforcement officers would be able to reply to charges of
misconduct that are publicly made against them. The media would remain
free to criticize or to defend official conduct, malfeasance or delay, and to urge
prosecution. And even the restrictions that are imposed would be limited in
duration, applying only during the period when the threat to the fairness of
an impending or on-going trial is greatest.

Id.
8 For articulate analysis of the British system with revealing illustrations of its
operation, see A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PuBLicrrY 141-57 (1967),
-eviewed, Ainsworth, 42 TUL. L. REv. 450 (1968) ; Moll, 45 J. URBAN L. 200 (1967);
D. GILLmOR, FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL 158-76 (1966).
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men or others who prejudice fair trial by advance publicity. The
ABA Committee rejects the British contempt system as well as
proposals to legislate limits on what the press may publish in advance
of trial.9 It does, however, recommend cautious use of the contempt
power in a narrow class of situations against intentionally prejudicial
publicity during trial.1"
I have doubts concerning the constitutionality and effectiveness of
this narrow remedy. Although the period of the trial itself is the most
crucial from the standpoint of prejudice, it is also the period during
which the constitutional guarantee of publicity is most explicit." Statements during trial can be made by a wide variety of persons, more or
less interested in the outcome, for a wide variety of reasons. The
motive for such statements and their intended effect will be hard to
prove. If the courts rigorously apply the requirements of prejudicial
motive and intent to disseminate, the contempt power will seldom be
exercised under the recommendations, and will be ineffective. On
the other hand, if the courts relax the requirements, there will be a
serious danger of stifling protected publication. As noted by the
ABA Committee (p. 153), the Supreme Court has reserved the
question whether sanctions on publication might be permissible when
publicity is "aimed at influencing the outcome of a trial." 1 This is
9ABA TENTATIVE Dar
69. Most responsible commentators have rejected the
idea of instituting a contempt system patterned after the British practice. See, e.g.,
A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY 155-57 (1967); D. GILLmOR,
FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIA-L

176 (1966);

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RADIO, TELEVISION,

AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE AsSOCIATIoN OF THE BAR OF THE CrrY
OF NEW YORK, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL 10 (1967) [hereinafter cited

after the chairman of the committee, Judge Harold R. Medina].
Scholarly debate about the possibility of legislating restrictions on pre-trial publicity has concentrated on the Morse Bill:
It shall constitute a contempt of court for any employee of the United
States, or for any defendant or his attorney or the agent of either, to furnish
or make available for publication information not already properly filed with
the court which might affect the outcome of any pending criminal litigation,
as

MEDiNA REPORT,

except evidence that has already been admitted at the trial. Such contempt
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000.
S.290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), quoted in D. GLLmOR, FREE PRESS AND FAIR
TRIAL 235 (1966). Although recommended vigorously by some, see S. ZAGRI, FREE
PRESS, FAIR TRIAL 38 (1966), the bill was opposed by the Department of Justice and
the American Civil Liberties Union, among others. D. GILLmOR, FREE PRESS AND FAIR
TRIAL 192 (1966). Legislative attempts to control prejudicial publicity are open to
much the same criticisms as discretionary controls through use of the contempt power.
Id. at 195-96; MEDINA REPORT 10-11.
10 Thus if a person, knowing that [a criminal] trial is in progress, makes a
statement about the defendant or the case that goes beyond the public record,
that is reasonably calculated to affect the outsome, and that seriously threatens
to have such an effect, he should be subject to judicial discipline.
ABA TENTATIVE: DRAFT 72-73 (footnote omitted). See id. at 150-54. In the ABA
PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, the recommendations relating to use of the contempt power
were narrowed by substituting the phrase "wilfully designed by that person" for
"reasonably calculated," and by requiring a showing of actual intent to disseminate.
Id. at 27-28.
11 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
12

Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389 (1962).
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hardly a firm foundation for an experiment in regulating the press by
use of comtempt sanctions. In any event, the bar should certainly
first try to clean its own house by controlling the lawyers and personnel
involved in investigation.
4) Some lawyers would like to see journalists agree on a code
of ethics regarding publication of news prejudicial to a fair trial. Such
a code would not comprise rules of law, violation of which would
result in the imposition of sanctions such as fine or imprisonment. The
code would express only what journalists could agree to be the proper
line of self-restraint. Many journalists are keenly aware of the unfairness of extensive pretrial publicity.' 3 Some feel compelled to sansationalize because their competitors are exploiting the situation. 4 If the
newspapers could come to an agreement among themselves about
professional standards in this area, much would be accomplished.
The ANPA Report proposes a number of arguments to answer
those made by the legal profession. It stresses that sensational cases,
where any danger to a fair trial might occur, comprise only a very
small proportion of all criminal proceedings. Any danger, the argument runs, can be remedied by existing legal procedures. For example,
the Report suggests that trial can be postponed for a time if the community has been excessively stirred up, or that the trial can be moved
to another locality. However, there are serious political obstacles to
continuance of a sensational criminal trial, and a change of venue in
this age of wide news coverage can do little to avoid the possibilities
of prejudice. It is true, as the Report points out, that jurymen can
be eliminated if it appears, on questioning, that they are so biased as
not to be able to make their decision solely on the basis of evidence
presented in court. But where prejudicial publicity has been pervasive,
voir dire is an insufficient remedy. The Report recommends more
extensive isolation and instruction of the jury, but recognizes the
impracticality of the former, and should recognize the difficulty of
dispelling prejudicial impressions through instructions. 5 The only
other safeguards suggested by the Report are the various postconviction remedies (retrial, appeal, and habeas corpus). (Pp. 38-40)
The ANPA Report is an indiscriminate and intemperate rejection
of all reform proposals. What can one say to an eminent committee
that presents one of its principal conclusions as follows:
13 There are several impressive examples of voluntary guidelines adopted by news
media to reduce the possibility of prejudice. E.g., CBS News, Official Communication, May 24, 1965, reproduced in part in Taylor, Crime Reporting and Publicity of
Criminal Proceedings, 66 COLum. L. REV. 34, 60 (1966); Massachusetts Guide for
the Bar and News Media (1963), reproduced in ABA TENTATIVE DRAirr 262-65.
See A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUB3LICITY 123-26 (1967); AMERICAN
NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL 100-06 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as ANPA REPORT].
14 See A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLIcITY 35-37 (1967).
15 For the Supreme Court's view of this difficulty, see Bruton v. United States,
88 s. Ct. 1620, 1623-28 (1968).
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The people's right to a free press which inherently embodies the right of the people to know is one of our most
fundamental rights, and neither the press nor the Bar has the
right to sit down and bargain it away. (P. 1)
To pose the issue as whether freedom of the press may be bargained
away is the kind of inflammatory nonsense that can only impede the
efforts of concerned men in both professions who are seeking a
legitimate and practical solution to a difficult problem.
The ANPA would have done better to come forward with at
least one or two suggestions for a voluntary code of ethics on the
subject of pretrial publicity. 6 After all, most newspapers do have
ethical standards of a similar character. For example, newspapers
voluntarily withhold the names and addresses of women who have
been raped, and of children who get involved in small-scale delinquency.
The press often-perhaps too often-delays the release of information
relating to the national defense, at the request of government officials.
Newspapers frequently follow a policy of professional courtesy under
which they avoid or minimize reports adverse to other journals or
publishers. Why not come to an understanding of what professional
ethics demand in relation to pre-trial publication?
As I hacked my way through the rhetoric of the ANPA Report,
I began to realize that the real bone of contention is the proposal to
restrict the police from supplying pretrial news to reporters. The
Report dramatizes the difference between "free and uninhibited access
to information" and "censorship at the source of news." (P. 1)
The problem is a tough one, and deserves better, more reflective
treatment than the ANPA gave it. A moment's thought would explode
the position that newspapers under all circumstances have an absolute
right to know and publish anything the public would be interested to
read. National security, to begin with, necessitates "censorship at the
source;" nobody expects the Defense Department to disclose all it
knows about the intentions or armaments of potential enemies, or our
own counter-measures. Interests far less important than national
survival suffice to cut off news at the source. Interests in property
and profits are accepted as justifying the settled policy allowing giant
publicly-held corporations to control the news they distribute. Newspapers themselves do a little healthy "censorship at the source" when
they deny the right even of courts and grand juries to know the conand
fidential sources of a reporter's expos6 of political corruption
tolerated crime.
However, deciding whether or how to control the release of inof a
formation concerning matters which may become the subject
16 For the mixed reactions of some eminent newsmen to the idea of self-imposed
(1966).
standards, see D. GILLmOR, FmEE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL 107-14, 177-80
Examples of voluntary guidelines are cited in note 13 supra.

1124

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

Vo1.116

criminal trial involves a more subtle balancing of constitutional interests
than is required in the instances just described. The first amendment
guarantees freedom of the press, and the sixth amendment guarantees
"a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." The necessity for
adjustment arises because total lack of self-restraint by the press at
17
times may be inimical to the right to be tried by an impartial jury.
Although the ANPA Report asserts that "liberty of the press
supports nothing except a freedom from [all] censorship," (p. 23),
there is strong authority that as a historical proposition, freedom of the
press meant freedom to publicize views and information about public
matters.'8 The potentially prejudicial details surrounding a private
individual's alleged crime add little to informed public discussion of
political or social ideas. If necessary to preserve free trial, such details
could be withheld without infringing true freedom of the press.
So the question is not whether there can or should be "censorship
at the source," but rather how to draw the line between information
which can constitutionally be withheld, and information which must be
released in the public interest. In view of the admirable role played
by some newspapers in the discovery and disclosure of important
political and governmental evils, it would seem reasonable and appropriate to expect the press to help delineate the cases where a
temporary delay in releasing some details of a crime would inhibit the
type of publication guaranteed by the Constitution. Unfortunately,
the ANPA Report is silent on this point.
One may or may not agree with every proposal of the ABA
Committee's recommendations, but the legal profession can take pride
in its thorough documentation, in the scrupulous fairness with which
the problem was examined, and in the temperance with which conclusions were expressed. One would expect no less from the group
of eminent, and on the whole, conservative, judges and lawyers constituting the ABA Committee. One might have hoped that the press
would deal more fairly with these recommendations. Perhaps this will
vet come about; for, after delivering itself of the ANPA Report, the
Publisher's Association now proposes to study the matter."
17 As the ANPA REPORTpoints out, it is not clear whether the guarantee of public

may
trial runs to the public or the accused. (Pp. 31-32.) But a decision on the point
whether
trial
fair
from
detract
can
publicity
since
difference,
practical
little
make
publicity is a right of the public or of the accused, and since it is probable that the
right to publicity belongs to both the public and the accused.
18 The evils to be prevented were . .

.

any action of the government by means

of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters
as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise
of their rights as citizens.
T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LiMITATioNs 604 (7th ed. 1903), quoted in Z. CHATEE,
FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (1954).
19 Phila. Bulletin, Jan. 4, 1968, at 6, cols. 3-5. The sum of $150,000 was appropriated for the project. Id.
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